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SOUTH CAROLINA TORT LAW: FOR WHOM THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
TOLLS-THE EPSTEIN COURT'S REJECTION OF THE CONTINUOUS
REPRESENTATION RULE
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, in Epstein v. Brown,' Dr. Franklin M. Epstein appealed the circuit
court's judgment that section 15-3-530(5)2 barred his legal malpractice suit against
David A. Brown.3 Prior to the court of appeals' consideration of Epstein's appeal,
the South Carolina Supreme Court certified his case from the court of appeals
pursuant to South Carolina Appellate Court Rule 204(b),4 heard it on January 4,
2005, and filed judgment on March 21, 2005.' In deciding the case, the Epstein
court addressed whether to adopt the "continuous representation" rule.6 The
continuous representation rule tolls the statute of limitations in legal malpractice
actions until the lawyer-defendant no longer represents the client in the underlying
subject matter." A divided court rejected the rule and affirmed the circuit court's
judgment that section 15-3-530(5) barred Epstein's legal malpractice action because
the statute of limitations began to run at his trial's conclusion on February 18,
1998.8
The Epstein court's holding problematically rejects the continuous
representation rule in legal malpractice actions. Epstein's precedential strength is
uncertain because of: (1) the absence of a statute of repose governing legal
malpractice actions, unlike the six year statute of repose governing medical
malpractice actions in South Carolina;9 (2) the strength and applicability of the
1. 363 S.C. 372, 610 S.E.2d 816 (2005).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-530(5) (2005). The statute provides the following statute of limitations:
"three years ... [for] an action for assault, battery, or any injury to the person or rights of another, not
arising on contract and not enumerated by law, and those provided for in section 15-3-545." South
Carolina Code section 15-3-545 does not affect legal malpractice actions because it only applies to
medical malpractice actions. See id. § 15-3-545.
3. Epstein, 363 S.C. at 374-75, 610 S.E. 2d at 817.
4. South Carolina Appellate Court Rule 204(b) provides:
In any case which is pending before the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court
may, in its discretion, on motion of any party to the case, on request by the Court
of Appeals, or on its own motion, certify the case for review by the Supreme
Court before it has been determined by the Court of Appeals. Certification is
normally appropriate where the case involves an issue of significant public
interest or a legal principle of major importance. The effect of such certification
shall be to transfer jurisdiction over the case to the Supreme Court for all
purposes.
S.C. App. CT. R. 204(b).
5. Epstein, 363 S.C. at 372, 610 S.E.2d at 816.
6. Id. at 377, 610 S.E. 2d at 818.
7. Id. at 377, 610 S.E. 2d at 818
8. See id. at 374, 382-83, 610 S.E.2d at 817, 821-22.
9. See S.C. CODE ANN § 15-3-545(D) (2005).
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secondary authority the Epstein court relied upon; and (3) the specific facts of
Epstein.
This Note analyzes current South Carolina jurisprudence regarding legal
malpractice actions, the applicable statute of limitations, and the continuous
representation rule. Further, it compares current South Carolina jurisprudence in
medical malpractice actions with legal malpractice actions and evaluates what steps
the South Carolina Supreme Court might take in shaping South Carolina's legal
malpractice jurisprudence.
II. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND TOLLING PROVISIONS: SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW PRIOR TO EPSTEIN
The general three-year statute of limitations period in section 15-3-530(5)
governs legal malpractice actions in South Carolina.0 Additionally, South Carolina
courts apply the "reasonable diligence" principle established in section 15-3-535
to determine when the statute of limitations begins to run in legal malpractice
actions."
A. South Carolina's "Discovery Rule": Determining When a Cause ofAction
Accrues
For actions listed in section 15-3-530(5),2 section 15-3-535 shifts the start of
the statutory period from "the time of the injury"1 3 to when "the person knew or by
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that he had a cause of
action."' 4 Occasionally, South Carolina courts have mistakenly interchanged the
"discovery rule" provision with the "notice standard."' 5 The discovery rule,
10. Id. § 15-3-530(5). This statute establishes the general three-year statute of limitations for most
tort actions in South Carolina that arise or accrue after April 5, 1988, including legal malpractice
actions. Id.; see Epstein v. Brown, 363 S.C. 372, 376, 610 S.E.2d 816, 818 (2005); Berry v. McLeod,
328 S.C. 435,444-45, 492 S.E.2d 794, 799 (Ct. App. 1997). For negligence actions arising before April
5, 1988, a six-year statute of limitations governed. See Mitchell v. Holler, 311 S.C. 406, 408-09, 429
S.E.2d 793, 795 (1993) (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-530 (Supp. 1992)).
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-535 (2005).
12. Id. § 15-3-530(5).
13. Holy Loch Distribs., Inc. v. Hitchcock, 332 S.C. 247, 252, 503 S.E.2d 787, 790 (Ct. App.
1998), rev'd on other grounds, 340 S.C. 20, 531 S.E.2d 282 (2000). Under early South Carolina
common law, "an action based on negligence accrues for statute of limitations purposes, when the
negligent act is committed." Mills v. Killian, 273 S.C. 66, 70, 254 S.E.2d 556, 558 (1979) (citing
Thomas' Ex'rs. v. Ervin's Ex'rs., 25 S.C.L. (Chev.) 22,25 (1839)).
14. § 15-3-535.
15. Sections 15-3-535 and 15-3-545 establish similar rules for determining the date when the
statutory period begins to run. However, they do not create identical standards. Nevertheless, South
Carolina courts often use the language "the discovery rule" to refer to both sections even though section
15-3-535 only creates an exercise of reasonable diligence standard. Compare Epstein, 363 S.C. at 376,
610 S.E.2d at 818 (expounding both rules), and True v. Monteith, 327 S.C. 116, 119, 498 S.E.2d 615,
616-17 (1997) (using the discovery rule to refer to the standard section 15-3-535), and Dean v. Ruscon
Corp., 321 S.C. 360, 363, 468 S.E.2d 645, 647 (1996) (combining language from section 15-3-535 and
[Vol. 57: 643
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established in section 15-3-545(A)-(B), 6 governs medical malpractice actions,
while the notice standard governs legal malpractice actions. 7 This double standard
has not caused many problems in practice. However, South Carolina courts'
tendency to interchange language between medical malpractice and legal
malpractice cases reveals why the Epstein court may have improperly decided that
rejecting the "continuous treatment"' rule in medical malpractice actions equally
supported rejecting the continuous representation rule in legal malpractice actions. 9
B. Applying Section 15-3-535: The Exercise of Reasonable Diligence
Since section 15-3-535's enactment, South Carolina courts have developed an
extensive body of case law that applies and interprets the reasonable diligence
principle for beginning the statutory period in negligence actions. Shortly after
section 15-3-535's enactment, the South Carolina Supreme Court in Snell v.
Columbia Gun Exchange, Inc.2" attempted to define the exercise of reasonable
diligence.2' The Snell court held:
section 15-3-545 to describe the discovery rule), and Holy Loch Distribs., 332 S.C. at 252-53, 503
S.E.2d at 790 (stating that section 15-3-535 creates the discovery rule for tort actions), with Smith v.
Smith, 291 S.C. 420, 425-26, 354 S.E.2d 36, 39-40 (1987) (noting that the provisions in section 15-3-
535 and section 15-3-545 are similar but not identical).
16. Section 15-3-545(A) provides:
In any action, other than actions controlled by subsection (B), to recover damages
for injury to the person arising out of any medical, surgical, or dental treatment,
omission, or operation by any licensed health care provider as defined in Article
5, Chapter 79, Title 38 acting within the scope of his profession must be
commenced within three years from the date of the treatment, omission, or
operation giving rise to the cause of action or three years from the date of
discovery or when it reasonably ought to have been discovered, not to exceed six
years from the date of occurrence, or as tolled by this section.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-545(A) (2005) (emphasis added).
Section 15-3-545(B) provides:
When the action is for damages arising out of the placement and inadvertent,
accidental, or unintentional leaving of a foreign object in the body or person of
any one or the negligent placement of any appliance or apparatus in or upon any
such person by any licensed health care provider acting within the scope of his
profession by reason of any medical, surgical, or dental treatment or operation, the
action must be commenced within two years from the date of discovery or when
it reasonably ought to have been discovered; provided, that, in no event shall
there be a limitation on the commencement of the action less than three years after
the placement or leaving of the appliance or apparatus.
§ 15-3-545(B) (emphasis added).
17. § 15-3-535.
18. Harrison v. Bevilacqua, 354 S.C. 129, 138, 580 S.E.2d 109, 114 (2003).
19. For more detail regarding the differences between the applicable statutory period governing
legal malpractice actions and those governing medical malpractice actions, see infra Part IV.A.I.
20. 276 S.C. 301, 278 S.E.2d 333 (1981).
21. Id. at 303, 278 S.E.2d at 334.
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The exercise of reasonable diligence means simply that an injured
party must act with some promptness where the facts and
circumstances of an injury would put a person of common
knowledge and experience on notice that some right of his has
been invaded or that some claim against another party might exist.
The statute of limitations begins to run from this point and not
when advice of counsel is sought or a full-blown theory of
recovery developed.22
South Carolina courts continue to apply this interpretation of the reasonable
diligence principle in negligence actions.23 After Snell, the supreme court
determined an objective test determines when a person should have known
operative facts.2
In Wiggins v. Edwards,25 the supreme court held an objective test applied and,
without directly citing precedent, broadly stated that adopting a subjective test
would have gone against "well-settled law."26 Accordingly, South Carolina courts
have based their decisions about when the statutory period began on whether
"person[s] of common knowledge"27 should have known they might have a claim
against another party.2" The Wiggins court attempted to further clarify the proper
way to determine the operative date and established:
"The important date under the discovery rule is the date that a
plaintiff discovers the injury, not the date of the discovery of the
identity of another alleged wrongdoer. If, on the date of injury, a
plaintiff knows or should know that she had some claim against
someone else, the statute of limitations begins to run for all claims
based on that injury."29
22. Id. at 303, 278 S.E.2d at 334.
23. Epstein v. Brown, 363 S.C. 372, 376, 610 S.E.2d 816, 818 (2005) (applying the principle in
a legal malpractice action); see also Dean v. Ruscon Corp., 321 S.C. 360, 363-64, 468 S.E.2d 645, 647
(1996) (applying the principle in an action for damage to real property); Mitchell v. Holler, 311 S.C.
406, 409, 429 S.E.2d 793, 795 (1993) (applying the principle in a legal malpractice action); Smith v.
Smith, 291 S.C. 420, 425, 354 S.E.2d 36, 40 (1987) (applying the principle as persuasive authority in
a medical malpractice action).
24. Holy Loch Distribs., Inc. v. Hitchcock, 332 S.C. 247, 253-55, 503 S.E.2d 787, 791 (Ct. App.
1998), rev'don other grounds, 340 S.C. 20, 531 S.E.2d 282 (2000).
25. 314 S.C. 126, 442 S.E.2d 169 (1994).
26. Id. at 128-29, 442 S.E.2d at 170.
27. Kreutner v. David, 320 S.C. 283, 285, 465 S.E.2d 88, 90 (1995).
28. Epstein, 363 S.C. at 376, 610 S.E.2d at 818; see Kreutner, 320 S.C. at 285, 465 S.E.2d at 90;
Mitchell, 311 S.C. at 409,429 S.E.2d at 795; Snell v. Columbia Gun Exchange, Inc., 276 S.C. 301,303,
278 S.E.2d 333, 334 (1981); Holy Loch, 332 S.C. at 253-54, 503 S.E.2d at 790-91; Berry v. McLeod,
328 S.C. 435, 444-45, 492 S.E.2d 794, 799 (Ct. App. 1997); Wilson v. Shannon, 299 S.C. 512, 513,
386 S.E.2d 257, 258 (Ct. App. 1989).
29. Wiggins, 314 S.C. at 128-29,442 S.E.2d at 170 (1994) (quoting Tollison v. B & J Mach. Co.,
812 F. Supp. 618, 620 (D.S.C. 1993)).
[Vol. 57: 643
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Consequently, a plaintiff's discovery of new or different tortfeasors "has absolutely
no bearing on the timing of the statute of limitations."3 Thus, a hypothetical victim
who discovered his injury when the accident occurred but did not know the
tortfeasor's identity until three years after the accident would have his claim barred
against the true tortfeasor and could only bring an action against another alleged
torfeasor.31
C. Section 15-3-40: Tolling the Statutory Period for Disabilities
In addition to the discovery rule, section 15-3-40 creates a tolling provision
applicable to legal and medical malpractice cases.32 Section 15-3-40 provides the
general tolling provisions for cases involving minors and the insane.3 The phrase
"an action mentioned in Article 5 of this chapter" within section 15-3-40, brings
legal malpractice actions under this section's tolling provisions.34
D. The Effects of Adopting the Continuous Representation Rule in Legal
Malpractice Actions
In Harrison v. Bevilacqua,3 the South Carolina Supreme Court emphasized it
had only entertained adopting a version of the continuous treatment rule that
contained a discovery exception in prior cases. 36 Thus, only the application of a
continuous representation rule with a discovery exception is relevant to the
discussion in this Note.
The Epstein court did not directly define a version of the continuous
representation rule with a discovery exception. However, the Epstein court
30. Cline v. J.E. Faulkner Homes, Inc., 359 S.C. 367, 371, 597 S.E.2d 27, 29 (Ct. App. 2004).
31. This hypothetical assumes the plaintiff cannot use South Carolina's relation back doctrine to
amend his complaint to bring in the proper tortfeasor as a defendant. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-40 (2005).
33. Id. Section 15-3-40, entitled "Exceptions as to persons under disability," states:
If a person entitled to bring an action mentioned in Article 5 of this chapter
[actions other than recovery of real property] or an action under Chapter 78 of this
title [the South Carolina Tort Claims Act], except for a penalty or forfeiture or
against a sheriff or other officer for an escape, is at the time the cause of action
accrued either:
(1) within the age of eighteen years; or
(2) insane;
the time of the disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement
of the action, except that the period within which the action must be brought
cannot be extended:
(a) more than five years by any such disability, except infancy; nor
(b) in any case longer than one year after the disability ceases.
Id.
34. Id.
35. 354 S.C. 129, 580 S.E.2d 109 (2003).
36. Id. at 135, 580 S.E.2d at 112.
2006]
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indicated it recognized a version analogous to the Harrison court's continuous
treatment rule:
"The so-called continuous treatment rule as generally formulated
is that if the treatment by the doctor is a continuing course and the
patient's illness, injury or condition is of such a nature as to
impose on the doctor a duty of continuing treatment and care, the
statute does not commence running until treatment by the doctor
for the particular disease or condition involved has
terminated-unless during treatment the patient learns or should
learn of negligence, in which case the statute runs from the time
of discovery, actual or constructive." '37
However, prior to acknowledging the Harrison rule, the Epstein court enunciated
a version of the rule that did not include a discovery exception."8 Under this version
"the SOL is tolled during the period an attorney continues to represent the client on
the same matter out of which the alleged malpractice arose." '39 This version would
only toll the statute of limitations during the period the defendant-attorney
continued to represent the plaintiff-client, seemingly in contradiction to section 15-
3-535.40
In contrast, if South Carolina adopted a version of the continuous
representation rule that contained a discovery exception, the rule would toll the
three year statutory period4 only during the time between the alleged negligence
and the time when the plaintiff should have known he had a cause of action.
Additionally, the rule would toll the statute of limitations during that period only
if the defendant-attorney continued to represent the client-plaintiff throughout that
period, and the statutory period would begin to run immediately after the defendant-
attorney's continued representation ends.42
37. Epstein v. Brown, 363 S.C. 372,610 S.E.2d, 819 (2005) (quoting Harrison, 354 S.C. at 135,
580 S.E.2d at 112).
38. Compare id. at 378, 610 S.E.2d at 819 (describing a version of the continuous treatment rule
that contains a discovery provision), with id. at 377, 610 S.E.2d at 818 (describing a version of the
continuous representation rule that does not include a discovery provision).
39. Id. at 377, 610 S.E.2d at 818 (citing George L. Blum, Annotation, Attorney
Malpractice-Tolling or Other Exceptions to Running of Statute of Limitations, 87 A.L.R. 5th 473
(2001)).
40. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-535 (2005).
41. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-530(5) (2005).
42. For more on the importance of this formulation of the continuous representation rule and its
application in the context of Epstein, see infra Part IV.A.3.
[Vol. 57: 643
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III. EPSTEIN VBROWN: THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND, PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND,
AND JUDGMENT
A. Welch v. Epstein: Giving Rise to Epstein 's Legal Malpractice Claim
Epstein v. Brown arose out of a medical malpractice action brought against Dr.
Epstein. 3 Epstein performed neurosurgery on Marshall 0. Welch, Jr. Due to
complications arising from the neurosurgery, Welsh died on February 29, 1996,
while in post-operative care." Subsequently, Welch's estate brought wrongful death
and survival actions against Epstein. 5 Welch's estate alleged that Epstein's
negligence during Welch's post-operative treatment proximately caused the
patient's death.' Brown, a licensed South Carolina attorney, represented Epstein
in the medical malpractice action. -On February 18, 1998, the jury returned a
verdict against Epstein." "The jury awarded actual damages of $28,535.88 in the
survival suit, $3,000,000 in the wrongful death claim, and punitive damages of
$3 ,900,000. ' '4 9 Brown advised Epstein to appeal the judgment," and "Brown filed
a notice of appeal on behalf of Dr. Epstein."51
On appeal, Epstein raised three issues: "(1) the denial of their motions for
directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV); (2) the denial
of their new trial motion based upon the excessiveness of the actual and punitive
damages verdicts; and (3) the jury charge on punitive damages." 2 Attorneys
Stephen P. Groves, Sr., John Hamilton Smith, and Stephen L. Brown actively
represented Epstein in the appeal, and during the appeal, David A. Brown only
remained as Epstein's counsel of record.13 The appellate court affirmed the trial
court's judgment.5 4
43. Welch v. Epstein, 342 S.C. 279, 288-94, 536 S.E.2d 408, 413-16 (Ct. App. 2000).
44. Id. at 288-94, 536 S.E.2d at 413-16. On February 22, 1996, Epstein performed neurosurgery
on Welch to try to cure Welch's persistent and severe back pain. Welch remained in post-operative care
at Aiken Regional Medical Center from his admission on the morning of February 22, 1996, until his
removal from life support on February 29, 1996. Id. at 288-94, 536 S.E.2d at 413-16.
45. Epstein v. Brown, 363 S.C. 372, 374, 610 S.E.2d 816, 817 (2005).
46. See Welch, 342 S.C. at 288-94, 536 S.E.2d at 413-16.
47. Epstein, 363 S.C. at 374, 610 S.E.2d at 817.
48. Id. at 374, 610 S.E.2dat 817.
49. Welch, 342 S.C. at 287, 536 S.E.2d at 412. Following the verdict, the trial judge ordered a
partial set-offagainst the verdicts based on a settlement with a prior defendant. Id. The Welch court used
"Doe" to refer to the defendant to "protect the anonymity of the settling co-defendant pursuant to a
confidentiality agreement." Id. at 312 n.3, 536 S.E.2d at 425 n.3.
50. Epstein, 363 S.C. at 384, 610 S.E.2d at 822 (Pleicones, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 375, 536 S.E.2d at 817.
52. Welch v. Epstein, 342 S.C. 279, 287-88, 536 S.E.2d 408, 412 (Ct. App. 2000).
53. Epstein, 363 S.C. at 375, 610 S.E.2d at 817 (noting that Brown, the defendant in Epstein, did
not actively represent Epstein on appeal).
54. Welch, 342 S.C. at 314-15, 536 S.E.2d at 426. The appellate court upheld the trial court's
"denial of Dr. Epstein's motions for directed verdict and JNOV as to actual and punitive damages" and
its denial of a new trial motion "based upon the size of the actual damages award," but the appellate
court did reverse the jury instruction regarding punitive damages and ruled that "Dr. Epstein is entitled
to a set-off in the sum of $421,464.12 as to the wrongful death verdict" based on the defendant's
2006]
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B. Epstein 's Legal Malpractice Claim and Appeal
On January 9, 2002, Epstein filed a legal malpractice action against Brown.5
In describing Epstein's allegations, the Epstein court stated:
In his complaint, Dr. Epstein alleged Brown was negligent in
numerous particulars, including: failing to conduct an adequate
investigation, failing to advise Epstein to settle, failing to keep
Epstein adequately informed during the pendency of the case,
representing multiple defendants with conflicts of interest,
forgetting to call expert witnesses, and adopting a defense which
was contrary to Dr. Epstein's medical opinion.56
Additionally, the Epstein court noted that Epstein conceded he was already aware
of many of his allegations when the jury rendered the verdict." Brown moved for
summary judgment asserting the statute of limitations barred Epstein's legal
malpractice action.5"
The circuit court granted Brown's motion for summary judgment and ruled the
statutory period began to run no later than February 18, 1998, the date of the jury's
verdict." The circuit court made this determination based on the following findings:
1) the majority of Epstein's alleged damages stemmed from the jury's adverse
verdict; 2) Epstein suffered the claimed damages resulting from negative publicity
at the time of the verdict; and 3) a successful appeal could have only mitigated
these damages.' Based on these findings, the circuit court ruled that "Dr. Epstein
either knew, or should have known, of a possible claim against Brown by the date
of the adverse verdict, such that the SOL began to run on that date."'"
Epstein appealed the circuit court's decision, arguing that South Carolina
should adopt the continuous representation rule "to toll the SOL during the period
an attorney continues to represent a client on the same matter which forms the basis
settlement with the prior defendant Doe. Id. at 314-15, 536 S.E.2d at 426.
55. Epstein v. Brown, 363 S.C. 372, 375, 610 S.E.2d 816, 817 (2005).
56. Id. at 376, 610 S.E.2d at 818. The Epstein court did not evaluate the merits of Epstein's claim
because the court's holding that the statue of limitations barred Epstein's claim precluded any need for
substantive evaluation. See id. at 382-83,610 S.E.2d at 821. Therefore, whether Epstein's claim would
have satisfied the elements for a successful legal malpractice claim remains unclear because a
successful legal malpractice claim in South Carolina requires that a plaintiff "must prove several
elements: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) a breach of duty by the attorney; (3)
damage to the client; and (4) proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages by the breach." See Hall v.
Fedor, 349 S.C. 169, 174, 561 S.E.2d 654, 656 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing Smith v. Haynesworth, Marion,
McKay, & Guerard, 322 S.C. 433,435 n.2, 472 S.E.2d 612, 613 n.2 (1996)); Henkel v. Winn, 346 S.C.
14, 18, 550 S.E.2d 577, 579 (Ct. App. 2001); McNair v. Rainsford, 330 S.C. 332, 342,499 S.E.2d 488,
493 (Ct. App. 1998)).
57. Epstein, 363 S.C. at 376, 610 S.E.2d at 818.
58. Id. at 375, 610 S.E.2d at 817.
59. Id. at 375, 610 S.E.2d at 817.
60. Epstein v. Brown, 363 S.C. 372, 376, 610 S.E.2d 816, 818 (2005).
61. Id. at 376-77, 610 S.E.2d at 818.
[Vol. 57: 643
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of a legal malpractice claim."62 Thus, Epstein asserted that the statute of limitations
should not bar his legal malpractice action because Brown remained Epstein's
counsel of record throughout the appeal.63
C. Epstein: The Majority's Reasoning andBasisfor Rejecting the Continuous
Representation Rule
The majority determined the issue they had to decide was whether the circuit
court erred in ruling that "Dr. Epstein knew, or should have known, he had a
possible claim against Brown by the date of the jury's adverse verdict, such that the
SOL began to run on that date."64 The Epstein court determined the three year
statute of limitations period65 and the discovery rule governed Epstein's legal
malpractice action.66 The majority then addressed Epstein's argument for adopting
the continuous representation rule but declined to adopt the rule in legal malpractice
actions.67
The majority offered three authorities to justify rejecting the continuous
representation rule.6" First, the majority concluded the basis and reasoning for
rejecting the continuous treatment rule in medical malpractice suits also supports
rejecting the continuous representation rule in legal malpractice'suits.6 9 Second, the
majority cited "numerous jurisdictions [which] refuse to judicially adopt the
continuous representation rule"7 and opined that "[g]enerally, those jurisdictions
which adopt the continuous representation rule also adopt the continuous treatment
[rule] in the context of medical malpractice."'" Third, the majority rejected the rule
based on "the Legislature's declaration that an action 'must be commenced within
three years after the person knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should
have known he had a cause of action."' 72
62. Id. at 377, 610 S.E.2d at 818.
63. Id. at 377, 610 S.E.2d at 818.
64. Id. at 375, 610 S.E.2d at 818.
65. For further discussion, see supra Part II and note 10, which explain that section 15-3-530(5)
establishes the three-year period governing negligence actions in South Carolina.
66. Epstein, 363 S.C. at 372, 376-77, 610 S.E.2d 816, 818-19 (2005) (citing S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 15-3-530 (2005)). For more detail regarding the discovery rule and how South Carolina courts have
interpreted and applied the rule, see supra Part II.A-B (analyzing the statute's language and how the
statute has been interpreted and applied).
67. Epstein v. Brown, 363 S.C. 372, 376-77, 610 S.E.2d 816, 818-19 (2005) ("We decline to
adopt the continuous representation rule in the context of a legal malpractice claim and adhere, instead,
to the discovery rule set forth by the Legislature.").
68. See id. at 377-80, 610 S.E.2d at 818-20.
69. Id. at 378-80, 610 S.E.2d at 819-20.
70. Id. at 379, 610 S.E.2d at 819-20 (citing Law Offices of Jerris Leonard, P.C. v. Mideast Sys.,
Ltd., 111 F.R.D. 359, 363 (D.D.C. 1986); Beesley v. Van Doren, 873 P.2d 1280 (Alaska 1994); Laird
v. Blacker, 828 P.2d 691, 696 (Cal. 1992); Zupan v. Berman, 491 N.E.2d 1349, 1351-52 (111. 1986);
Chambers v. Dillow, 713 S.W.2d 896, 898-99 (Tenn. 1986)).
71. Id. at 379, 610 S.E.2d at 820.
72. Id. at 380, 610 S.E,2d at 820 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-535 (2005)).
20061
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The majority then addressed and rejected Epstein's argument that "even if [the
court does] not adopt the continuous representation rule, the statute of limitations
should not be deemed to have begun to run until the date on which this Court
denied certiorari (January 11, 2001), because it was not until that date upon which
he suffered legal damages."73 The majority recognized a split of authority regarding
"whether a plaintiff has suffered legally cognizable damages prior to the conclusion
of an appeal"74 and noted that "those jurisdictions which decline to adopt the
continuous representation rule tend to hold that a plaintiff may institute a
malpractice action prior to the conclusion of an appeal."" The majority thus
rejected Epstein's contention based on these authorities.76
The majority then addressed and rejected Epstein's argument "that requiring
him to pursue an appeal while simultaneously filing a malpractice suit against his
attorney puts him in the awkward position of arguing inconsistent positions in two
different courts."7 7 In addressing this argument, the majority pointed to other
jurisdictions that allow certain measures "to avoid such inconsistent positions.""
The court also discussed past interpretations of the discovery rule and asserted that
it is immaterial "that the injured party may not comprehend the full extent of the
damage.
79
Finally, the majority referenced the record, which indicated that even at trial
Epstein knew of some of Brown's alleged negligence and that the damages he
claimed primarily related to his reputation, errors at trial, and pre-trial
errors-thus,"[i]t is patent Dr. Epstein knew, or should have known, of a possible
claim against Brown long before this Court denied certiorari in January 2001."'°
Appropriately, the Epstein court affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary
judgment."'
D. Chief Justice Toal's Dissent
In Chief Justice Toal's short dissent, she opined that she would "adopt a bright-
line rule that the statute of limitations does not begin to run in a legal malpractice
action until an appellate court disposes of the action by sending a remittitur to the
73. Epstein v. Brown, 363 S.C. 372, 380, 610 S.E.2d 816, 820 (2005) (internal quotations
omitted).
74. Id. at 380,610 S.E.2d at 820 (citing Hunt v. Bittman, 482 F. Supp. 1017, 1022 (D.D.C. 1980),
aff'd, 652 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir 1981); Beesley v. Van Doren, 873 P.2d. 1280, 1283 (Alaska 1994); Laird
v. Blacker, 828 P.2d 691, 696 (Cal. 1992); Michael v. Beasley, 583 So. 2d 245, 252 (Ala. 1991),
overruled on other grounds by Borden v. Clement, 261 B.R. 275, 283 n.3 (N.D. Ala. 2001); St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Speerstra, 666 P.2d 255, 258 (Or. Ct. App. 1983)).
75. Id. at 380, 610 S.E.2d at 820.
76. Id. at 380-81, 610 S.E.2d at 820-21.
77. Id. at 381-82, 610 S.E.2d at 821.
78. Id. at 381-82, 610 S.E.2d at 821 (citing Morrison v. Goff, 91 P.3d 1050, 1056 (Colo. 2004);
Gebhardt v. O'Rourke, 510 N.W.2d 900, 907 (Mich. 1994)).
79. Epstein v. Brown, 363 S.C. 372, 382, 610 S.E.2d 816, 821 (2005).
80. Id. at 382, 610 S.E.2d at 821.
81. Id. at 383, 610 S.E.2d at 821.
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trial court.""2 Chief Justice Toal recognized the discovery rule and the nature of
reasonable diligence but disagreed with the majority's "holding that the appellants
should have known of the existence of a cause of action arising from respondent's
alleged malpractice at the conclusion of the trial."83
Instead, Chief Justice Toal indicated that evidence of the appellant's injury did
not exist "until the court of appeals disposed of the case by sending a remittitur to
the trial court."" Under Chief Justice Toal's rule, the statute of limitations would
not have barred Epstein's legal malpractice action because the statutory period
would have tolled throughout Epstein's appeal.85
E. Justice Pleicones's Dissent
In Justice Pleicones's dissent, he agreed with the majority's rejection of the
continuous representation rule and the retention of the discovery rule. 6 However,
Justice Pleicones concluded the statute of limitations did not bar Epstein's action
because "Brown should be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a
defense."87
Justice Pleicones primarily based his conclusion on Kleckley v. Northwestern
National Casualty Co.88 Kleckley addressed when a South Carolina court should
estop a defendant from asserting the statute of limitations to defeat an action.89 The
court determined that applying estoppel in this quasi-tolling form requires "the
delay that otherwise would give operation to the statute ha[ve] been induced by the
defendant's conduct."9 The Kleckley court further established "[s]uch inducement
may consist of an express representation that the claim will be settled without
litigation or conduct that suggests a lawsuit is not necessary" and "may also involve
inducing the plaintiff either to believe that an amicable adjustment of the claim will
be made without suit or to forbear exercising the right to sue."'"
According to Justice Pleicones, the court should have estopped Brown from
asserting the statute of limitations as a defense because "Brown affirmatively
represented to Epstein that the adverse verdict had resulted from errors of law
committed by the trial judge" and because "Brown [] remained nominally as
82. Id. at 383, 610 S.E.2d. at 822 (Toal, C.J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 383-84, 610 S.E.2d at 822.
84. Id. at 384, 610 S.E.2d at 822.
85. Epstein v. Brown, 363 S.C. 372, 382, 610 S.E.2d 816, 821 (2005).
86. Id. at 384, 610 S.E.2d at 822 (Pleicones, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 384, 610 S.E.2d at 822.
88. Id. at 384, 610 S.E.2d at 822 (citing Kleckley v. Nw. Nat'l Cas. Co., 338 S.C. 131, 136-37,
526 S.E.2d 218, 220 (2000)).
89. Kleckley, 338 S.C. at 136, 526 S.E.2d at 220.
90. Id. at 136, 526 S.E.2d at 220 (quoting Black v. Lexington Sch. Dist. No. 2, 327 S.C. 55, 61,
488 S.E.2d 327, 330 (1997)).
91. Id. at 136, 526 S.E.2d at 220 (citing Black, 327 S.C. at 61, 488 S.E.2d at 330; Republic
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counsel to Epstein throughout the appeal from the verdict."92 Thus, "the circuit
court erred by holding that Brown's representations coupled with his presence on
the appellate team did not reasonably induce Epstein's forbearance."'93 Therefore,
under Justice Pleicones's dissent, the statute of limitations would not have barred
Epstein's legal malpractice action.
IV. ANALYZING THE EPSTEIN COURT'S REASONING
A. The Majority's Basis
The Epstein court's rejection of the continuous representation rule in legal
malpractice actions seems to be a logical extension of South Carolinajurisprudence
regarding the statute of limitations, the discovery rule, and the rejection of the
continuous treatment rule in medical malpractice actions. Rejection of the rules
appears logical because, although the rules apply to different contexts, the
continuous representation rule and the continuous treatment rule share similar
justifications94 and similar effects.95 However, the Epstein court's reasoning and its
holding are questionable because: (1) the differences between the statute of
limitations governing legal malpractice actions and the statute of repose governing
medical malpractice actions, (2) the strength and applicability of the secondary
authority upon which the Epstein court relied, and (3) Epstein's operative ,facts.
1. Comparing the Statute of Limitations Governing Legal Malpractice
and the Statute of Repose Governing Medical Malpractice in South
Carolina
The Epstein court's rationale for rejecting the continuous representation rule
paralleled the court's prior rationale for rejecting the continuous treatment rule in
Harrison v. Bevilacqua.96 Also, even though the South Carolina Supreme Court had
not yet addressed adopting the rule, the Epstein court pointed to Holy Loch
Distributors, Inc. v. Hitchcock to show the court of appeals had already rejected the
continuous representation rule "based in large part on [the court of appeals'] refusal
to adopt the 'continuous treatment' rule in the context of medical malpractice
cases." '97 However, comparing the Harrison court's reasoning with the Epstein
92. Epstein, 363 S.C. at 384, 610 S.E.2d at 822.
93. Id. at 384, 610 S.E.2d at 822.
94. Epstein v. Brown, 363 S.C. 372, 378, 610 S.E.2d 816, 819 (2005).
95. See Holy Loch Distribs, Inc. v. Hitchcock, 332 S.C. 247, 258, 503 S.E.2d 787, 793 (Ct. App.
1998), revd on other grounds, 340 S.C. 20, 531 S.E.2d 282 (2000); see also Epstein, 363 S.C. at 377,
610 S.E.2d at 818 (describing the rule's effect by stating: "Under the continuous representation rule,
the SOL is tolled during the period an attorney continues to represent the client on the same matter out
of which the alleged malpractice arose.").
96. Epstein, 363 S.C. at 377-78, 610 S.E.2d at 818-19 (discussing Harrison v. Bevilacqua, 354
S.C. 129, 135, 580 S.E.2d 109, 112 (2003)).
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court's basis exposes slight differences in the reasonings, making the application
of the court of appeals' reasoning in Harrison to legal malpractice actions dubious.
In Harrison, a psychiatric patient remained in continuous care at a state
hospital from the date of his involuntary commitment in 1982 until his discharge
on March 6, 1995.98 On June 1, 1995, the patient. sued the South Carolina
Department of Health, alleging medical malpractice.99
Initially, the Harrison court cited prior South Carolina Supreme Court cases
that rejected the continuous treatment rule." The Harrison court then summarized
four policy arguments in favor of adopting the rule.' The Harrison court followed
those policy arguments by stating that "[t]he primary argument against adoption of
the continuous treatment rule is that it offends the clear policy set by the Legislature
in its adoption of statutes of limitations and statutes of repose."'0 2
Section 15-3-545 creates a six-year statute of repose governing medical
malpractice actions in South Carolina.1 13 The Harrison court interpreted section 15-
3-545 as an "outer limit beyond which a medical malpractice claim is barred,
regardless of whether it has or should have been discovered."' ' The court further
asserted that "a statute of repose is typically an absolute time limit beyond which
liability no longer exists and is not tolled for any reason because to do so would
upset the economic balance struck by the legislative body."'0 5 The court offered
only those statements in response to the four policy arguments in favor of adopting
the continuous treatment rule.'0 6 Thus, its interpretation of section 15-3-545
constituted the Harrison court's sole basis for "find[ing] judicial adoption of the
continuous treatment rule would run afoul of the absolute limitations policy the
Legislature has clearly set via the statutes discussed above."'0 7 The Harrison court
also opined, "Certainly, this is an area where the Legislature can create statutory
law if it so chooses."108
98. Harrison v. Bevilacqua, 354 S.C. 129, 132, 580 S.E.2d 109, 110-11 (2003).
99. Specifically, the patient alleged "the Department had been negligent because McLean [the
patient]: (1) had been confined in the hospital too long; (2) should not have resided in a locked ward;
and (3) had been improperly medicated." Id. at 132, 580 S.E.2d at 111.
100. Id. at 135, 580 S.E.2d at 112 (citing Preer v. Mins, 323 S.C. 516, 519,476 S.E.2d 472,473
(1996); Anderson v. Short, 323 S.C. 522, 524-25, 476 S.E.2d 475, 476-77 (1996)).
101. Id. at 136-37, 580 S.E.2d at 112-13. Generally, the four policy justifications the court
recognized are: 1) the rule prevents requiring a plaintiff to sue his physician before termination of his
treatment; 2) the rule supports a patient's right to place trust and confidence in his physician; 3)
actionable treatment usually does not consist of a single act, and lessens the difficulty in determining
a precise time of occurrence; and 4) tort law's basic principles are efficiency and fairness.
102. Id. at 137, 580 S.E.2d at 113.
103. Id. at 137, 580 S.E.2d at 113 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. §15-3-545 (2005)).
104. Harrison v. Bevilacqua, 354 S.C. 129, 137-38,580 S.E.2d 109,113 (2003) (quotingLangley
v. Pierce, 313 S.C. 401, 403, 438 S.E.2d 242, 243 (1993)).
105. Id. at 138, 580 S.E.2d at 113-14 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Langley, 313 S.C. at404, 438
S.E.2d at 243).
106. See id. at 133-39, 580 S.E.2d at 111-14.
107. Id. at 138, 580 S.E.2d at 114.
108. Id. at 138, 580 S.E.2d at 114.
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In Epstein, the supreme court determined:
[T]he justifications favoring adoption of the continuous treatment
rule are similar to those justifying the continuous representation
rule, to wit: to avoid disruption of the attorney client relationship;
to allow an attorney to continue efforts to remedy a bad result,
even if some damages have occurred and the client is aware of the
attorney's errors.'0 9
Ultimately, the Epstein court rejected the continuous representation rule based, at
least partially, on the existence of section 15-3-535."0 However, section 15-3-545
and section 15-3-535 differ in important ways.
The Harrison court emphasized that section 15-3-545(D).. creates a statute of
repose establishing an "absolute time limit beyond which liability no longer exists"
in medical malpractice actions." 2 However, neither section 15-3-535 nor section
15-3-530(5) create a statute of repose governing legal malpractice actions." 3
Instead, those sections create a general three-year statute of limitations in legal
malpractice actions.' This distinction' 5 may indicate the South Carolina
Legislature is unwilling to create the same "absolute time limit""' 6 for legal
malpractice actions which is observed in medical malpractice actions. Indeed, prior
case law indicates the importance of this distinction." 7
109. Epstein v. Brown, 363 S.C. 372, 378, 610 S.E.2d 816, 819 (2005).
110. Specifically, the Epstein court declared, "[i]n accord with these authorities, and in light of
the Legislature's declaration that an action 'must be commenced within three years after the person
knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known he had a cause of action,' we
decline to adopt the continuous representation rule." Id. at 380, 610 S.E.2d at 820 (quoting S.C. CODE
ANN. § 15-3-535 (2005) (emphasis added) (omissions in original)).
111. Section 15-3-545(D) states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 15-3-540, if a person entitled to bring
an action against a licensed health care provider acting within the scope of his
profession is under the age of majority at the date of the treatment, omission, or
operation giving rise to the cause of action, the time period or periods limiting
filing of the action are not tolled fora period of more than seven years on account
of minority, and in any case more than one year after the disability ceases. Such
time limitation is tolled for minors for any period during which parent or guardian
and defendant's insurer or health care provider have committed fraud or collusion
in the failure to bring an action on behalf of the injured minor.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-545(D) (2005) (emphasis added).
112. Harrison, 354 S.C. at 138, 580 S.E.2d at 113-14 (quoting Langley v. Pierce, 313 S.C. 401,
404, 438 S.E.2d 242, 243 (1993)).
113. See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-3-530(5) & 535 (2005).
114. See id.
115. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1450-51 (8th. ed. 2004) (defining a statute of limitation as
"a statute establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued"
and a statute of repose as "[a] statute barring any suit that is brought after a specified time since the
defendant acted ... even if this period ends before the plaintiff has suffered a resulting injury").
116. Harrison v. Bevilacqua, 354 S.C. 129, 138,580 S.E.2d 109, 113-14 (2003) (quotingLangley,
313 S.C. at 404, 438 S.E.2d at 243).
117. Langley, 313 S.C. at 402-04, 438 S.E.2d at 242-44.
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In Langley v. Pierce, the plaintiff sued her former physician for medical
malpractice."' The timing in Langley is as follows: the alleged negligence occurred
in 1980, the physician moved to Florida in 1984, and the plaintiff filed suit in
1991.119 The Langley court addressed whether the tolling provision created by
section 15-3-30, specifically the language "in this chapter," applied to the statute
of repose created by section 15-3-545.2° The court held the tolling provision did
not apply based on the distinction between a statute of repose and a statute of
limitations.' To support this point, the opinion referenced a Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals holding which stated "[a] statute of limitations is a procedural device
that operates as a defense to limit the remedy available from an existing cause of
action [while a] statute of repose creates a substantive right in those protected to be
free from liability after a legislatively-determined period of time."'22 The Langley
court further distinguished its holding from precedent by stating, "However, each
of these cases involved a statute of limitations, not one of repose."'2 Thus, this
distinction has proven crucial to whether the South Carolina Supreme Court will
allow tolling exceptions to apply to a particular statutory period.Additionally, South Carolina courts have applied estoppel in a quasi-tolling
manner" to prevent defendants "from claiming the statute of limitations as a
defense."' 25 The permissive use of the statute of limitations as a defense (by
rejecting the continuous representation rule) does not comport with the traditional
118. See Langley, 313 S.C. at 402, 438 S.E.2d at 242.
119. Id. at 402-04, 438 S.E.2d at 242-44.
120. The Langley court directly quoted the language:
"[I] f when a cause of action shall accrue against any person he shall be out of the
State, such action may be commenced within the terms in this chapter respectively
limited after the return of such person into this State. And if, after such cause of
action shall have accrued, such person shall depart from and reside out of this
State ... for the space of one year or more, the time of his absence shall not be
deemed or taken as any part of the time limited for the commencement of such
action."
Langley, 313 S.C. at 403, 438 S.E.2d at 243 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-30 (2005)). Additionally,
the South Carolina Supreme Court has determined section 15-3-30's tolling provision, based on an out-
of-state defendant, does not apply "when the nonresident defendant is amenable to personal service of
process and the defendant can be brought within the personal jurisdiction of our courts." Meyer v.
Paschal, 330 S.C. 175, 184, 498 S.E.2d 635, 639 (1998).
121. See Langley v. Pierce, 313 S.C. 401,403-05, 438 S.E.2d 242, 243-44 (1993).
122. Langley, 313 S.C. at 403-05,438 S.E.2d at 243 (quoting First United Methodist Church of
Hyattsville v. U.S. Gypsum, 882 F.2d 862, 865-66 (4th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted)).
123. Id. at 405, 438 S.E.2d at 244 (citing Cutino v. Ramsey, 285 S.C. 74, 328 S.E.2d 72 (1985);
Harris v. Dunlap, 285 S.C. 226, 328 S.E.2d 908 (1985); Parker v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 285 S.C.
231, 328 S.E.2d 909 (1985)).
124. See Kleckley v. Nw. Nat'l Cas. Co., 338 S.C. 131, 136-37, 526 S.E.2d 218, 220 (2000);
Black v. Lexington Sch. Dist. No. 2, 327 S.C. 55, 61, 488 S.E.2d 327, 330 (1997); Langley, 313 S.C.
at 384-85, 610 S.E.2d at 822 (Pleicones, J., dissenting); Holy Loch Distribs., Inc. v. Hitchcock, 332 S.C.
247,254-57,503 S.E.2d 787,791-92 (CL App. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 340 S.C. 20,531 S.E.2d
282 (2000).
125. Klecldey, 338 S.C. at 136, 526 S.E.2d at 220 (quoting Black, 327 S.C. at 58, 488 S.E.2d at
2006]
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use of estoppel as a tolling mechanism. This discrepancy reveals a further basis to
question the strength of the Epstein majority opinion.
If the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted the continuous representation
rule, it would only toll the statute of limitations where a defendant-attorney
continued to represent a plaintiff-client on the same underlying action that formed
the basis for the legal malpractice claim.'26 Allowing tolling in these limited
circumstances conforms to the supreme court's recent interpretation of the purpose
of a statute of limitations in Mortiarty v. Garden Sanctuary Church of God.27 The
Mortiarty court stated, "The limitations period is intended to run against those who
are neglectful of their rights and who fail to exercise reasonable diligence in
enforcing their rights. However, it is not the policy of the law to unjustly deprive
an injured person of a remedy."' 28 A client's reliance on his attorney's advice that
an appeal will correct a trial's adverse result hardly seems neglectful of his rights.
Additionally, adopting the continuous representation rule would protect the
sanctity of the attorney-client relationship. This contention finds support in the
supreme court's previous statement that
[a] client should not be expected to investigate an attorney's
loyalty every time the attorney provides the client with counsel
the client dislikes. Instead, absent other facts, the client should be
able to rely on the attorney's advice and should be able to follow
this advice without fear the attorney is not acting in the client's
best interest.'29
Thus, judicially adopting the continuous representation rule, at least where the
defendant-attorney suggested filing an appeal, is consistent with South Carolina
jurisprudence.
In the future, the supreme court could dispel potential inconsistencies while
rejecting the continuous representation rule by determining that section 15-3-535
also establishes "an absolute time limit beyond which liability no longer exists."'3°
However, that outcome seems unlikely because of the court's prior recognition of
the difference between a statute of repose and a statute of limitations when deciding
whether to allow additional tolling exceptions to a statutory period.'3 '
126. Epstein v. Brown, 363 S.C. 372, 377, 610 S.E.2d 816, 818 (2005). See supra Part II.D.
127. 341 S.C. 320, 534 S.E.2d 672 (2000), abrogated by State v. Cherry, 361 S.C. 588, 597, 606
S.E.2d 475, 479-80 (2004).
128. Id. at 333, 534 S.E.2d at 679.
129. True v. Monteith, 327 S.C. 116, 120,489 S.E.2d 615, 617 (1997).
130. Harrison v. Bevilacqua, 354 S.C. 129, 138, 580 S.E.2d 109, 113-14 (2003) (quoting Langley
v. Pierce, 313 S.C. 401, 404,438 S.E.2d 242, 243 (1993)).
131. Langley, 313 S.C. at 405, 438 S.E.2d at 244.
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2. The Epstein Court's Support for Rejecting the Continuous
Representation Rule: Persuasive Authority
The Epstein court, without specifically addressing the policy arguments for
adopting the rule, cited multiple cases from other jurisdictions and claimed those
cases supported rejecting the continuous representation rule.'32 Analyzing those
opinions reveals they offer limited, if any, support to the Epstein court's holding.
In the short parenthetical following a citation to Beesley v. Van Doren, the
Epstein court indicated that the case supported the conclusion that the "statute of
limitations in attorney malpractice cases is not tolled pending final resolution of
litigation underlying [the] malpractice claim."' 33 However, the Beesley court, after
citing a principle similar to South Carolina's discovery rule,'34 rejected the
"exhaustive appeals" doctrine, not the continuous representation rule.'35 The
exhaustive appeals doctrine differs from the continuous representation rule because
it tolls the statutory period throughout the appellate process, regardless of whether
an allegedly negligent attorney remained the plaintiffs attorney on appeal. 3 6 It is
helpful to note Beesley did not address the adoption of the continuous
representation rule after the court opined it might adopt the rule to "resolve the
concern for the attorney-client relationship raised by some courts which have
rejected the 'exhaustion of appeals' rule."' 37 Therefore, the Beesley court's opinion
lends some support to the Epstein court's reasoning but does not completely
support Epstein s rejection of the continuous representation rule.
Further, the Epstein court cited Laird v. Blacker, indicating that it stands for the
proposition that the "limitations period commences and is not tolled by filing an
132. Epstein v. Brown, 363 S.C. 372,379-80,610 S.E.2d 816,819-20 (2005) (citing Law Offices
of Jerris Leonard, P.C. v. Mideast Sys. Ltd., 111 F.R.D. 359 (D.D.C. 1986); Beesley v. Van Doren, 873
P.2d 1280 (Alaska 1994); Laird v. Blacker, 828 P.2d 691 (Cal. 1992); Chambers v. Dillow, 713 S.W.2d
896 (Tenn. 1986); Zupan v. Berman, 491 N.E.2d 1349 (Ill. 1986)).
133. Id. at 379-80, 610 S.E.2d 819-20 (citing Beesley, 873 P.2d at 1283).
134. Compare Beesley, 873 P.2d at 1283 ("The statute of limitations begins running when a client
discovers or reasonably should have discovered all the elements of the cause of action, and suffers
actual damages."), with Epstein, 363 S.C. at 376, 610 S.E.2d at 818 ("the statute of limitations is
triggered not merely by knowledge of an injury but by knowledge of facts, diligently acquired,
sufficient to put an injured person on notice of the existence of a cause of action against another").
135. The Beesley court did not define the exhaustion of appeals doctrine; it cited to Amfac
Distribution Corporation v. Miller (Amfac I1), 673 P.2d 792 (Ariz. 1983). See Beesley, 873 P.2d at
1282. The Amfac IT court determined, under the exhaustion of appeals doctrine, a cause of action for
legal malpractice that occurs during the course of litigation does not accrue until "the plaintiff knew or
should reasonably have known of the malpractice and when the plaintiff's damages are certain and not
contingent upon the outcome of an appeal." Amfac 11, 673 P.2d at 793 (quoting Amfac Distrib. Corp.
v. Miller (Amfac 1), 673 P2d 795, 796 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983)). However, the continuous representation
rule does not focus on the damages; instead, the rule tolls the statutory period based solely on "the
period an attorney continues to represent the client on the same matter out of which the alleged
malpractice arose." Epstein, 363 S.C. at 377, 610 S.E.2d at 818.
136. See Beesley, 873 P.2d at 1283 n.4.
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appeal absent continuous representation by the trial attorney."'138 In Laird, the
California Supreme Court did not address whether to adopt the continuous
representation rule because the defendant-attorneys did not continue to represent
the plaintiff-client in the period between the alleged negligent representation and
the malpractice action. 39 Also, California courts would have no reason to address
adopting the continuous representation rule because the rule is statutorily mandated
in California.'" Therefore, the Epstein court's use of this case to support rejection
of the continuous representation doctrine is questionable.
Next, the Epstein court cited Law Offices of Jerris Leonard, P.C. v. Mideast
Systems Limited, indicating that case stands for the proposition that "under [the]
discovery rule, [a] legal malpractice claim was deemed to have occurred when
summaryjudgment [was] entered against it or at latest when [the] answer was due
in [a] suit for legal fees."'' The Jerris court did not address adopting the
continuous representation rule. 42 Instead, the Jerris court only held, under the
discovery rule, the plaintiff-client's knowledge affects the commencement of the
statutory period.'43 Thus, Jerris does not support the Epstein court's proposition
that "[n]otwithstanding such justifications, numerous jurisdictions refuse to
judicially adopt the continuous representation rule."'"
Additionally, the Epstein court cited Zupan v. Berman, indicating that case
stands for the proposition that the "statute of limitations for legal malpractice began
to run when [an] adverse judgment was entered, not when [the] appellate court
modified [the] judgment."' 45 In Zupan, the court addressed the date when the
alleged malpractice accrued; it did not address the continuous representation rule.'"
Furthermore, the allegedly negligent defendant-attorney in Zupan did not continue
to represent the plaintiff-client on appeal. 47 Thus, even if the Zupan court had
addressed adopting the continuous representation rule, the rule would not have
tolled the statute of limitations in that particular case.
Finally, the Epstein court cited Chambers v. Dillow, indicating the Chambers
court held an injury for malpractice accrued when the court initially dismissed the
action.' In Chambers, the plaintiff did not present a tolling theory based on the
138. Epstein, 363 S.C. at 379, 610 S.E.2d at 819 (citing Laird v. Blacker, 828 P.2d 691 (Cal.
1992)).
139. Laird, 828 P.2d at 692-93.
140. Id. at 692 (quoting CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 340.6 (a)(2) (1982) (providing that the statute of
limitations governing legal malpractice actions tolls where "[t]he attorney continues to represent the
plaintiff regarding the specific subject matter in which the alleged wrongful act or omission occurred")).
141. Epstein, 363 S.C. at 379, 610 S.E.2d at 819 (citing Law Offices of Jerris Leonard, P.C. v.
Mideast Sys. Ltd., 111 F.R.D. 359 (D.D.C. 1986)).
142. See Jerris, 111 F.R.D. at 359-63.
143. Id. at 363.
144. Epstein v. Brown, 363 S.C. 372, 379, 610 S.E.2d 816, 819 (2005).
145. Id. at 379, 610 S.E.2d at 819-20 (citing Zupan v. Berman, 491 N.E.2d 1349 (1l1. 986)).
146. Zupan, 491 N.E.2d at 1351-52.
147. Id. at 1350.
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defendant-attorney's continued representation because the facts indicated
continuous representation did not occur. 49 Therefore, the Chambers court neither
addressed whether to adopt the continuous representation rule nor mentioned the
continuous representation rule or any similar tolling exceptions. 50
Analyzing these cases reveals troubling differences between the positions they
advocate and the Epstein court's use of them to support its statement that
"[n]otwithstanding such justifications, numerous jurisdictions refuse to judicially
adopt the continuous representation rule."'' Therefore, the Epstein court's use of
these authorities to bolster its reasoning for rejecting the continuous representation
rule is unpersuasive.
3. Epstein: The Operative Facts
The Epstein court focused on: (1) Epstein's concession that he knew about
many of his legal malpractice allegations against Brown at the time of the verdict'52
and (2) Brown's only nominal representation of Epstein during the appellate
process. ' Based on these facts, the court concluded the statute of limitations period
began to run at the trial's conclusion" 4 because the statute of limitations runs from
the time when a person of common knowledge would have reason to know a claim
might exist "and not when advice of counsel is sought or a full-blown theory of
recovery developed."' 55 However, the absence of either of these two facts in future
legal malpractice actions could create problems for litigants in South Carolina.
Epstein's direct knowledge of Brown's negligence at the time of the trial
verdict made adopting a version of the continuous representation rule with a
discovery provision irrelevant in determining whether the statutory period barred
Epstein's claim.'56 Indeed, allowing the continuous representation rule to toll the
statutory period in Epstein would have directly contradicted South Carolina's
discovery rule.' 57 However, subsequent cases with facts similar to Epstein could
present circumstances that make rejecting the continuous representation rule seem
harsher than in Epstein. For example, given the complex nature of legal
proceedings, equity is not served by barring a less sophisticated client's claim when
149. See Chambers, 713 S.W.2d at 896-97.
150. See id. at 896-99.
151. Epstein, 363 S.C. at 379, 610 S.E.2d at 819-20.
152. Id. at 376, 382-83, 610 S.E.2d at 818, 821.
153. Id. at 377 n.2, 610 S.E.2d at 818 n.2.
154. Epstein v. Broivn, 363 S.C. 372, 382, 610 S.E.2d 816, 821 (2005).
155. Id. at 376, 610 S.E.2d at 818.
156. In Harrison v. Bevilacqua, the court addressed its previous rejections of the continuous
treatment rule and stated, "[b]ecause in [prior] cases the discovery exception would have precluded the
plaintiffs' claims, and thus they would not have benefited from the adoption of the continuous treatment
rule, the Court expressly declined to adopt the rule." 354 S.C. 129, 135, 580 S.E.2d 109, 112 (2003)
(citing Anderson v. Short, 323 S.C. 522,525,476 S.E.2d 475,476-77 (1996); Preer v. Mims, 323 S.C.
516, 520, 476 S.E.2d 472, 474 (1996)).
157. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-535 (2005).
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he did not concede subjective knowledge of the alleged negligence and trusted his
attorney's advice to appeal but failed the discovery rule's objective test.'
The Epstein court also focused on the fact that the defendant-attorney Brown
only remained Epstein's counsel of record and that another firm actively handled
the appeal." 9 The reference to this fact suggests the result, and perhaps the court's
rejection of the continuous representation rule, hinged on whether the defendant-
attorney continued to actively represent the plaintiff-client. Thus, attorneys could
attempt to distinguish Epstein from future legal malpractice actions on this basis.
In this context, a defendant-attorney could argue Epstein's holding depended on
Brown's lack of active representation during the appellate process. Otherwise,
Epstein directly conflicts with the supreme court's stated principle that "absent
other facts, the client should be able to rely on the attorney's advice and should be
able to follow this advice without fear the attorney is not acting in the client's best
interest."'"
B. Chief Justice Toal's Dissent: A Call for a Bright-Line Rule
Chief Justice Toal's dissent advocated the adoption of a "bright-line rule" that
"the statute of limitations does not begin to run in a legal malpractice action until
an appellate court disposes of the action by sending a remittitur to the trial court.'
6'
Under this rule, the statute of limitations would not have barred Epstein's legal
malpractice claim.62 Adopting Chief Justice Toal's rule would simplify judicial
attempts to determine when the statutory period begins to accrue in legal
malpractice actions. However, the rule's general language requires clarification
before one can evaluate its feasibility and consistency with South Carolina law.
Chief Justice Toal's general formulation of the rule and short analysis provides
little guidance regarding the possible effects of adopting her rule. Taking the
dissent's language on its face, Chief Justice Toal seems to have advocated a rule
similar-if not identical-to the exhaustion of appeals rule. The exhaustion of
appeals rule tolls the statute of limitations period during the appellate process,
regardless of continued representation. 63 Thus, Chief Justice Toal's proposed rule
creates an even more expansive tolling exception than the continuous representation
rule. Furthermore, in legal malpractice cases where the defendant-attorney does not
158. For more detail regarding the objective standard South Carolina courts apply under the
discovery rule established in section 15-3-535, see supra Part U.B.
159. Epstein, 363 S.C. at 377 n.2, 610 S.E.2d at 818 n.2.
160. True v. Monteith, 327 S.C. 116, 120, 489 S.E.2d 615, 617 (1997) (emphasis added).
161. Epstein, 363 S.C. at 383, 610 S.E.2d at 822 (Toal, C.J,, dissenting).
162. See supra Part 11.D (addressing the effect of Chief Justice Toal's rule on Epstein's legal
malpractice action).
163. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (addressing the exhaustion of appeals rule and
comparing it to the continuous representation rule).
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continue to represent the plaintiff-client, the primary policyjustifications for tolling
the statute of limitations no longer exist.'6
C. Justice Pleicones's Dissent: Applying Estoppel in Epstein
Justice Pleicones agreed with the Epstein majority's rejection of the continuous
representation rule and its retention of the discovery rule. 65 However, he would
have estopped Brown from asserting the statute of limitations to defend against
Epstein's claim.'" Justice Pleicones based his opinion on the principle established
in Kleckley v. Northwestern National Casualty Co. 67 Justice Pleicones's reasoning
and application of estoppel seems to promote the most logical resolution to the
Epstein problem.
First, the South Carolina Supreme Court has not overruled or limited the
Kleckley principle. The Kleckley court did not address using estoppel to toll the
statute of limitations in a legal malpractice action. 68 However, the Kleckley court
did not limit the principle to the facts of the particular case. Instead, the Kleckley
court phrased the principle broadly-asserting "[t]he defendant's conduct may also
involve inducing the plaintiff either to believe that an amicable adjustment of the
claim will be made without suit or to forbear exercising the right to sue.' 69 Given
the Kleckley court's broad language and the holding's undiminished precedential
strength, Justice Pleicones correctly concluded that the fact that Brown advised
Epstein to appeal estopped Brown from asserting the statute of limitations as a
defense.
Also, the supreme court in Vines v. Self Memorial Hospital, entertained
allowing estoppel to bar a defendant's assertion of the statute of limitations to
defend against an action for negligence.' 7 Although section 15-3-530(5) did not
govern that action,'' the Vines court addressed whether estoppel tolled the statute
of limitations governing the plaintiffs negligence claim and ultimately determined
estoppel did not apply.1 2 However, the Vines court made this ruling because
164. Epstein, 363 S.C. at 378, 610 S.E.2d at 819 ("We find the justifications favoring adoption
of the continuous treatment rule are similar to those justifying the continuous representation rule, to wit:
to avoid disruption of the attorney-client relationship; to allow an attorney to continue efforts to remedy
a bad result, even if some damages have occurred and the client is aware of the attorney's errors.").
165. Id. at 384, 610 S.E.2d at 822 (Pleicones, J., dissenting).
166. Epstein v. Brown, 363 S.C. 372, 372, 610 S.E.2d 816, 822 (2005).
167. Id. at 372, 610 S.E.2d at 822 (quoting Kleckley v. Nw. Nat'l Cas. Co., 338 S.C. 131, 136,
526 S.E.2d 218, 220 (2000) ("Under South Carolina law, a defendant may be estopped from claiming
the statute of limitations as a defense if the delay that otherwise would give operation to the statute ha[s]
been induced by the defendant's conduct." (alterations in original)).
168. Kleckley, 338 S.C. at 134-35, 526 S.E.2d at 219 (addressing a bad faith refusal to pay a
benefits action).
169. Id. at 137, 526 S.E.2d at 220.
170. 314 S.C. 305, 443 S.E.2d 909 (1994).
171. See id. at 306-07, 443 S.E.2d at 910 (determining the Tort Claims Act, S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 15-78-100 (2005), governed the action because the plaintiff brought a negligence claim against a state
owned hospital).
172. Id. at 308-09,443 S.E.2d at 911.
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"[h]ere, there is no showing that Vines delayed filing suit in reliance upon
Hospital's conduct;" '73 the court did not decide that estoppel does not ever apply
in actions for general negligence. Thus, South Carolina courts can estop a
defendant's use of the statute of limitations in general negligence actions that
sections 15-3-530(5) and 15-3-535 normally govern.
174
Therefore, if the facts in a legal malpractice action satisfy the Kleckley
requirements,'75 applying estoppel to toll the statute of limitations during the period
the defendant-attorney continued to represent the plaintiff-client on appeal does not
conflict with South Carolina law.176
Additionally, applying estoppel in Epstein would have allowed the court to
avoid the apparent contradiction between the continuous representation rule and the
court's decision in True v. Monteith without requiring the adoption of the
continuous representation rule.'77 Applying estoppel principles also would have
allowed the client to rely on his attorney's advice, which the True court
promoted,'78 and would not have required adopting another tolling exception to
section 15-3-535. This compromise would have been acceptable because South
Carolina law already permits using estoppel in this quasi-tolling manner.'79
Lastly, applying estoppel in legal malpractice actions would have prevented a
potential problem that is latent in the Epstein majority opinion. Under current South
Carolina law, negligent attorneys can avoid the consequences of their negligence
(and increase the amount of hours billed) by convincing a potential plaintiff-client
that the appellate process will rectify an adverse result. 8 In doing so, a negligent
attorney can extend the process long enough for the statute of limitations to accrue.
Applying estoppel to bar the statute of limitations defense in legal malpractice
actions would greatly reduce the potential for this type of abuse.
173. Id. at 308, 443 S.E.2d at 911.
174. Section 15-3-530 would have governed the plaintiff's general negligence action, instead of
section 15-78-100, had he sued a private party and not a state owned institution. See S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 15-3-530(5) (2005).
175. The Kleckley court appeared to outline these requirements when it stated:
"[A] defendant may be estopped from claiming the statute of limitations as a
defense if the delay that otherwise would give operation to the statute had been
induced by the defendant's conduct." Such inducement may consist of an express
representation that the claim will be settled without litigation or conduct that
suggests a law suit is not necessary. The defendant's conduct may also involve
inducing the plaintiff to either believe that an amicable adjustment of the claim
will be made without suit or to forebear exercising the right to sue.
Kleckley v. Nw. Nat'l Cas. Co., 338 S.C. 131, 136-37, 526 S.E.2d 218, 220 (2000) (citations omitted)
(quoting Black v. Lexington Sch. Dist. No. 2, 327 S.C. 55, 61, 488 S.E.2d 327, 330 (1997)).
176. See Hedgepath v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 348 S.C. 340, 355, 559 S.E.2d 327, 336 (Ct. App.
2001) (analyzing whether the facts warranted using the doctrine of equitable estoppel to toll the
statutory period when the plaintiffs alleged property damage or personal injury in a class action).
177. See True v. Monteith, 327 S.C. 116, 120, 489 S.E.2d 615, 617 (1997); supra note 160 and
accompanying text (addressing the rule regarding a client's right to rely on his attorney's advice).
178. See True, 327 S.C. at 120, 489 S.E.2d at 617.
179. Kleckley, 338 S.C. at 136-37, 526 S.E.2d at 220; Black, 327 S.C. at 61, 488 S.E.2d at 330.
180. See supra Parts 11, Ill (analyzing current South Carolina jurisprudence regarding legal
malpractice actions, the three year statutory period, the discovery rule, and the holding in Epstein).
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Given Epstein's operative facts and the majority's justifications for rejecting
the continuous representation rule, the supreme court's holding constitutes a
problematic rejection of the continuous representation rule. The majority justified
its holding on its previous rejection of the analogous continuous treatment rule,
multiple otherjurisdictions' rejections of the continuous representation rule, and the
belief that adopting the rule would directly contradict section 15-3-535. l However,
analyzing these justifications reveals potential flaws in the Epstein court's
reasoning, reveals the holding's diminished precedential strength, and reveals
potential problems that could arise under current South Carolina law.
James L. Floyd, III
181. See supra Part IV.
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